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The Journal of the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration at The George Washington University

Abstract

This article examines whether the institutional design of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) constraints its capacity to function as a national safety net. While prior research documents declining participation rates and substantial interstate variation, this analysis argues that these outcomes are not merely implementation failures but predictable consequences of TANF’s block grant structure and incentive framework. Drawing on economic theory and administrative evidence, the paper evaluates how fixed nominal funding, expansive state discretion, and work participation shape program results. The findings suggest that TANF’s fiscal and administrative architecture incentivizes caseload reduction over poverty reduction, limits responsiveness during economic downturns, and produces persistent cross-state inequities in access and benefit adequacy. By linking observed outcomes to institutional design, this article reframes debates about TANF's effectiveness and contributes to broader discussions about the governance of decentralized social assistance programs.

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